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   _____________ 
 
  O P I N I O N 
_____________ 
   
 
Sloviter, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case involves a novel question as to when a 
reduction in sentence based on retroactive changes to the 
sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine is applicable.  Jose 
Ortiz-Vega appeals his 108 month sentence for cocaine base 
(“crack”) offenses.  Ortiz-Vega argues that he is eligible for a 
sentence modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in light 
of retroactively applicable modifications to the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines dealing with crack cocaine offenses.  
For the reasons given below, we reverse the District Court’s 
denial of Ortiz-Vega’s request for sentence modification, and 
remand for further consideration in light of our decision.1 
 
 
 
 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and had jurisdiction to consider Ortiz-
Vega’s motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We exercise plenary review of a district court’s 
conclusions regarding the scope of its authority under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c).  United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
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I. 
 Ortiz-Vega pled guilty to multiple counts of crack 
cocaine possession and distribution, as well as possession of a 
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.  The 
District Court sentenced him on July 6, 2004 to 108 months 
imprisonment on the drug charges, a mandatory 60 months, to 
be served consecutively, on the firearm count, and 10 years of 
supervised release, all sentences suggested by the government 
in the plea agreement.    
 
 Various statutory provisions were applicable to Ortiz-
Vega’s sentence.  The Sentencing Guidelines called for a 
sentence of 97-121 months on the drug charges, and the gun 
offense carried a mandatory consecutive sentence of 60 
months.  18 U.S.C. § 24(c)(1)(A)(I).  Additionally, the drug 
charges carried, at the time, a mandatory minimum penalty of 
120 months.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006) (since 
amended several times, most recently in 2010).  This ought to 
have led to a sentencing range for Ortiz-Vega of 120-121 
months.  However, the mandatory minimum sentence was not 
asked for by the government, and was not applied by the 
District Court.  The District Court sentenced Ortiz-Vega to 
108 months on the drug charge, and the government did not 
challenge this, seek resentencing, or appeal within the 
relevant periods. 
 
 In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) was passed 
by Congress, seeking to “restore fairness to Federal Cocaine 
sentencing” by lowering the mandatory minimum penalties 
for distributing crack cocaine.  Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).  The FSA 
reduced the disparity in quantities triggering mandatory 
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minimum sentences between crack cocaine and powder 
cocaine from 100:1 to approximately 18:1.  Congress gave 
the Federal Sentencing Commission authority to promulgate 
new guidelines to conform the Sentencing Guidelines with 
the FSA’s new penalty ratios.  The new guideline, U.S.S.G. 
App. C, amd. 750, was promulgated in 2010, and made 
retroactive, effective November 1, 2011.  See U.S.S.G. App. 
C, amd. 759.  Under the new, retroactive Guidelines, the 
offense level for the drug offenses in Ortiz-Vegas’ case would 
be 30.  With the relevant upward and downward adjustments 
already established, this would lead to a Guideline range of 
78-97 months rather than 97-121 months for Ortiz-Vega.  See 
U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table). 
 
 In the sentence modifications proceedings before the 
District Court, the government argued, and the District Court 
accepted, that Ortiz-Vega was not eligible for a sentence 
reduction because such a reduction was blocked by operation 
of the 120 month mandatory minimum sentence that should 
have been, but was not, applied to Ortiz-Vega.  This decision 
was at least arguably consistent with the controlling precedent 
in this circuit at the time, United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 
309 (3d Cir. 2009).  Not long after the District Court denied 
Ortiz-Vega’s request for a sentence modification, however, 
this court, in United States v. Savani, 733 F.3d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 
2013), held that Doe had been superseded by the 2010 
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines.  Ortiz-Vega 
appealed. 
II. 
 This appeal presents the novel question of whether a 
defendant, who would otherwise be eligible for a sentence 
reduction based on a change in Guideline ranges, is rendered 
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ineligible for the reduction by a relevant mandatory minimum 
sentence, despite the fact that the mandatory minimum was 
not actually applied in his or her case. 
 
 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) governs modification of 
sentences in the case that a sentencing guideline has been 
changed.  It provides an exception to the normal rule, 18 
U.S.C.§ 3582(c), that a court may not modify a term of 
imprisonment once it has been imposed.  The exception 
provides: 
 
in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range 
that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon 
motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau 
of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may 
reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering 
the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent 
they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent 
with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  
 Following this rule would suggest that Ortiz-Vega 
should be eligible for a sentence reduction, as he was 
“sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing 
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission.”  (App. 5, 10)  However, a question arises here 
as to whether such a reduction would be, in this case, 
“consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by 
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the Sentencing Commission.”  The District Court held that it 
would not be.    
 
 In relevant part, Application Note 1(A) to Section 
1B1.10 of the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement 
states that a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is “not 
consistent with this policy statement if . . . (ii) an amendment 
listed in subsection (c) is applicable to the defendant but the 
amendment does not have the effect of lowering the 
defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the 
operation of another statutory provision (e.g., a statutory 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).”  These policy 
statements are binding on the courts.  See Dillon v. United 
States, 560 U.S. 817, 821 (2010) (“Any reduction must be 
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission.”). 
 
 The District Court, taking its lead from our decision in 
Doe, held that this policy statement rendered Ortiz-Vega 
ineligible for a sentence reduction because the “operation of . 
. . a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment” 
applied to him.  In such a case, the District Court held, the 
“mandatory minimum sentence subsumes and becomes the 
applicable guideline range for the Defendant.”  (App. 17 
(citing Doe, 564 F.3d at 312))  Because the District Court 
held that the policy statement ruled out reducing Ortiz-Vega’s 
sentence, it did not directly consider so-called “Step One” in 
the § 3582(c)(2) analysis, addressing whether or not Ortiz-
Vega’s sentence was “based on a sentencing range that has 
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”   
 
 The District Court, in denying Ortiz-Vega’s motion for 
sentence reduction, relied on our decision in Doe.  However, 
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in the time after the District Court’s decision, this court held 
that Doe was superseded by statute.  While, under Doe, the 
court understood the Sentencing Commission policy 
statement to require treating a mandatory minimum sentence 
as the “applicable guideline range” whether or not the 
mandatory minimum was actually applied to the particular 
defendant, in Savani we held that this interpretation had been 
foreclosed by revisions to the guideline commentary.  Savani,  
733 F.3d at 62.  After the November 2011 revisions to the 
Guidelines, the commentary to § 1B1.10 now defines 
“applicable guideline range” as “the guideline range that 
corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category 
determined pursuant to § 1B1.1(a), which is determined 
before consideration of any departure provisions in the 
Guidelines Manual or any variance.”  U.S.S.G § 1B1.10, 
Comment (n.1(A)) (Nov. 2011).  This suggests that 
“applicable guideline range” in § 1B1.10 means the 
sentencing range corresponding to the defendant’s offense 
level and criminal history category, not in terms of a 
mandatory minimum sentence if the mandatory minimum was 
not actually applied.  Savani, 733 F.3d at 62, 65. 
 
 After Savani, the District Court’s justification for 
denying Ortiz-Vega’s request for sentencing modification is 
no longer applicable.  The government, however, asks us to 
distinguish this case from Savani on the grounds that the 
defendants in Savani were given sentences below the 
otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentence because 
of substantial assistance departures, while this was not so in 
Ortiz-Vega’s case.  While not a complete non sequitur, this 
argument is not, in the end, convincing.  The plausible part of 
the government’s argument is that substantial assistance is 
one of the few explicit reasons for imposing a sentence below 
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the statutory mandatory minimum authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(e).  Imposing a sentence below the mandatory minimum 
is rarely, if ever, authorized on other grounds.  But, the 
commentary language itself does not provide the limitation 
the government seeks, and we see no reason to read it back 
into the rule itself.  The reason for not imposing a mandatory 
minimum sentence may be relevant when a district court 
decides whether to exercise discretion in granting a 
modification of sentence or not, but is not a part of the 
comment language itself, and it would be inappropriate to add 
this requirement on our own. 
 
III. 
 
The District Court decided that Ortiz-Vega was not 
eligible for a sentence modification under § 3582(c)(2) on the 
ground that such a modification would not be “consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.”  (App. 16)  Because the District Court wrongly 
held that Ortiz-Vega was not eligible for modification under 
this “Step Two” analysis, it did not address Step One.  We, 
however, must consider Step One.  This requires that the 
defendant have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment, 
“based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”  18. U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2). 
 
 The government here contends that, even though it was 
not actually applied to Ortiz-Vega, he was nonetheless 
“subject to” the mandatory minimum sentence, and therefore 
his sentence was not “based on a sentencing range that has 
subsequently been lowered.”  Ortiz-Vega contends that, while 
it is true that the mandatory minimum should have been 
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applied, it was not, and he was therefore not “subject to” it, 
and his sentence was therefore clearly “based on” a 
sentencing range (the crack cocaine Guidelines) that were 
subsequently changed.  There is some plausibility to both 
interpretations.  There is a plausible sense of “subject to” 
where Ortiz-Vega was “subject to” the mandatory minimum 
sentence even though it was not actually applied, given that it 
should have applied.   
 
 However, the more plausible interpretation would 
require that the mandatory minimum actually be applied — 
that the defendant be subjected to it — for the defendant to be 
ineligible for modification under Step One.  This 
interpretation fits better with the statutory language itself, 
since if a defendant is subjected to a mandatory minimum, he 
or she would not be given a sentence “based on a sentencing 
range that has subsequently been lowered.”  And, in Ortiz-
Vega’s actual case, it is quite clear from the District Court’s 
sentencing hearing that he was given a sentence “based on a 
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered.”  For 
this reason, it is clear that Ortiz-Vega meets the requirements 
for Step One, allowing him to seek a sentence modification. 
 
IV. 
 
 One additional basis for our decision that Ortiz-Vega 
is eligible for a sentence modification must also be discussed.  
While it is not completely clear why the mandatory minimum 
was not applied to Ortiz-Vega, this omission is characterized 
by the government and the District Court as a mistake or an 
error.  The government suggests that, in deciding whether to 
grant a sentence modification to Ortiz-Vega, we should act as 
if the mandatory minimum were actually applied, and 
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therefore deny the modification.  The District Court largely 
agreed with this, holding that to grant a modification at this 
point would be to “perpetuate [the] error” by “overlook[ing] 
the statutory mandatory minimum twice.”  (App. 21) 
 
 As Ortiz-Vega convincingly argues, however, this is 
almost exactly backwards.  As the District Court itself noted, 
prior sentencing errors cannot be modified in a § 3582(c)(2) 
proceeding.  This was confirmed by the Supreme Court, 
which has stated unequivocally that a court may not revisit or 
re-decide guideline applications during a § 3582(c)(2) 
proceeding, but rather must work only with the sentence 
actually imposed.  See Dillon, 560 U.S. at 831.  The large 
majority of cases that have addressed this issue have 
considered errors that went against the defendant.  But, there 
is no reason why this principle should apply only when it 
goes against defendants, and not when it benefits them, and 
nothing in the relevant court decisions would support such an 
interpretation.  As odd as it may seem, “perpetuating an 
error” is exactly what is required by Dillon in a case like this.  
The District Court was therefore incorrect to use the past 
error as a reason to deny a sentence modification.  
 
V. 
 
 The FSA not only called for change in the crack 
cocaine sentencing guidelines, it also lowered several 
mandatory minimum sentences.  If Ortiz-Vega had been 
convicted of the same crimes after the passage of the FSA, he 
would have faced a 60 month mandatory minimum, rather 
than the 120 months that should have applied to him.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B), as amended by Pub. L. 111-220 
(2010).  Ortiz-Vega argues that, if he is subject to a 
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mandatory minimum, it ought to be to the post-FSA 
mandatory minimum, a sentence that would be below his 
applicable guideline sentence.  Unlike his earlier arguments, 
this argument is without merit.  The FSA mandatory 
minimum was not made retroactive, and this court, and every 
other court of appeals to consider the issue, has held that the 
FSA mandatory minimums do not apply to defendants who 
committed their offenses and were sentenced prior to the 
enactment of the FSA in August, 2010.  See United States v. 
Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
 However, the fact that the FSA significantly lowered 
the mandatory minimum that someone like Ortiz-Vega would 
be subject to if his crime had taken place today may still have 
some relevance for this case.  The final decision as to whether 
to grant a sentence modification is a discretionary decision for 
the district court, even if a defendant qualifies for a 
modification under § 3582(c)(2).  This discretionary element 
is signaled by the language in § 3582(c)(2) that says “the 
court may reduce” the sentence (emphasis added).  The fact 
that the FSA has cut in half the mandatory minimum that 
someone like Ortiz-Vega would be sentenced to today surely 
tells in favor of exercising discretion in his favor to reduce his 
sentence.  The government suggests that the District Court 
had signaled that it would not exercise discretion in favor of 
Ortiz-Vega, and implies that this gives us further grounds to 
uphold the sentence.  Because the District Court found that it 
lacked authority to modify Ortiz-Vega’s sentence, the 
question of the District Court’s exercise of discretion in this 
case was not before us.   We will therefore remand so that the 
District Court can exercise its discretion.   
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VI. 
 
 This case presents an interaction of complex statutes, 
policy statements, and confused prior proceedings, making 
for a difficult and perhaps unique pattern.  However, for the 
reasons given above, we find that Ortiz-Vega is eligible for a 
sentence modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and 
remand to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this decision.  
